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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of two (2) issues by the Appellant from the Memorandum Decision and
Order on Appeal by the Honorable Mitchell W. Brown on March 11, 2019, upholding the
Magistrate's decision following a one ( 1) day trial on November 13, 201 7, modifying
Appellant's ("Father's") visitation and child support. 1
On September 1, 2016, Respondent ("Mother") filed a Verified Motion to Modify
Decree of Divorce through counsel. Father, through counsel, filed an Answer responding to
Mother's Verified Motion. After a hearing on Mother's Motion for Temporary Orders, the
Magistrate court set the matter for trial on May 23, 201 7. On May 23, 201 7, Mother and
counsel were present for trial, however, Father, nor his counsel were present and the
Magistrate court entered an order "grant[ing] everything in the Petition to Modify in full." 2
On July 25, 2017, Father appeared through new counsel and filed: (1) a Motion to Set
Aside Default, (2) Alternative Motion to Reconsider, (3) Alternative Motion to Set Aside,
and (4) a Motion for Stay3. The Magistrate court on August 15, 2017, issued it Minute Entry
and Order granting Father' Motion to Set Aside the Modified Decree of Divorce.
Subsequently, the Magistrate court, following one (1) rescheduling took the matter up for
trial on November 13, 2017.
After hearing testimony from both parties, third-party witnesses, and admitted evidence
on the record, the Magistrate court issued its' Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
("F.F. & C.L.") and its Judgment on January 16, 2018.

1 See R., Vol. I, p. 150-152.
2 See Tr.of May 23, 2017 Hrg., Vol. I, p.8, L.13-17.
3 See R., Vol. Ip. 152; The District Court recognized that Appellant filed a Rule 306, Rule 503(B), Rule
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEFI 5

In its' F.F. & C.L.'s and Judgment the Magistrate court modified Father's visitation
rights with the parties' minor children reducing the Father's time from 35% to 20% and
modified Father's child support increasing the Father's support for the benefit of the children
to $1,200.00 from $853.00. The Magistrate court left intact Father's joint legal and physical
custody of the parties' minor children. 4
On February 20, 2018, Father filed his Notice of Appeal of the Magistrate's Judgment.
After taking the matter up for appeal, the District Court on March 31, 2019, issued its'
Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal affirming the Magistrate's Judgment.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A. Can the custody and visitation rights of a parent and his children be modified
without consideration of the "best interests" of the children, including any factors
in Idaho Code§ 32-717(1)?
B. When considering a parent's income received in excess of a forty (40) hour work
week ("overtime"), is the court required to examine, address, and apply each of
the standards expressly set forth in Rule 126(F)(l)(a)(ii) of the Idaho Rules of
Family Law Procedure
III.ARGUMENT
A. When modifying the custody and visitation rights of a parent and his/her children,
in determining what is in the "best interests" of the children, the court must
consider all relevant statutory factors outlined in Idaho Code § 32-717, however, the
factors outlined in Idaho Code§ 32-717, is not exhaustive or mandatory and the
court is free to consider other factors that may be relevant to the "best interests"
standard.

1.

Standards of Review:
a. De Novo Review

A de novo standard of review as to questions of law is applied by this Court. Zeyen v.

Pocatello/Chubbuck School Dist. No. 25,451 P.3d 25, 29 (2019). This Court exercises free

807A(1)(7), Rule 989(1)(6) motions pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure.
4 See R., Vol. I, p. 126-133. In its F.F.& C.L. the trial court's foot note No. 1, notes that evidence presented was
regarding past history of the children's actual physical custody with the Father.
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEFI 6

review over the lower court's conclusions oflaw. Doe v. Doe, Idaho 162 254, 256 (2017). This
Court also exercises free review when interpreting the meaning of a statute. Id.

b. Abuse of Discretion
"The determination of whether to modify child custody is left to the sound discretion of
the trial court, and this Court will not attempt to substitute it judgment and discretion for that of
the trial court expect in cases where the record reflects a clear abuse of discretion." Woods v.

Woods, 163 Idaho 904, 906-907, 422 P.3d 1110, 1112-1113 (2018).
A Trial court does not abuse its discretion as long as the court "recognizes the issue as
one of discretion, acts within the outer limits of its discretion and consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the available choices and reaches it decision through an exercise of
reason." Lamont v. Lamont, 158 Idaho 353, 356, 347 P.3d 645, 648 (2015); quoting Roberts v.

Roberts, 138 Idaho 401,403, 64 P.3d 327, 329 (2003). Only when the evidence is insufficient to
support a magistrate's conclusion that the interests and welfare of the children would be best
served by a particular custody award or modification, does this Court determine a Trial Court
abused its discretion. Id. Nor, will this Court set aside the findings on appeal unless they are
clearly erroneous such that they are both based upon substantial and competent evidence. Id.

c. Sufficiency of Evidence
"Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance. It is
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Kelly v. Kelly,
No. 46748, 2019 WL 5485180, at *11 (Idaho Oct. 25, 2019); quoting Ehrlich v. Delray

Maughan, MD., P.L.L. C., Idaho 80 (2019). Substantial evidence does not require that the
evidence be uncontradicted. Id. Rather, the evidence need only be of sufficient quantity and
probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that the fact finder's conclusion was
proper. Id.
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEFI 7

The evidence adduced at trial by both parties was of sufficient quantity and of probative
value for the trial court to conclude it was in the children's "best interests" for Father's visitation
rights to be modified from 35% to 20%. 5
2.

The lower courts did examine or address the best interests of the children
and the reduction in visitation of the Father should be affirmed.

The Lower Courts correctly concluded that modification of Father's visitation rights was
in the "best interests of the children" as codified in Idaho Code§ 32-717(1) as the trial court has
wide discretion in its statutory application of Idaho Code § 32-717(1) and may consider factors
others than those enumerated in Idaho Code § 32-71 7( 1).
The trial court modified the Father's visitation rights with the children after it concluded
that it was "in the best interests of the children," that Father's visitation rights be more in line
with the visitation he had been exercising as a result of his own unilateral acts. 6 Further, the
District Court concluded that the trial court had, "an abundance of evidence in the record which
supports the trial court's findings of fact number 4."7
It is not necessary for trial courts to strictly adhere to Idaho Code § 32-717 ( 1)' s
enumerated factors in its conclusion as to whether modification is in the children's best interests.
Rather, the trial court in determining whether modification is in the children's best interests
requires it to apply all relevant factors outlined in Idaho Code § 32-71 7( 1), and any other
relevant factor not-outlined in Idaho Code § 32-71 7( 1) to supports its' conclusions; as long as the
trial court does not overemphasize one particular factor; and it finds the other factor relevant.

Searle v. Searle, 162 Idaho 839,844,405 P.3d 1180, 1185 (2017).

5 See R., Vol. I, p. 155-159.
6 Though not specifically found by the lower courts', both the trial court and District Court found that Father's
historic and current visitation schedule supported a modification of his visitation right.
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The record does not support Father's contention that the trial court's conclusion should
be reversed because the, "lower court's did not apply or recognize the appropriate legal standard
in this case." 8 In its F.F. & C.L.'s the trial court applied the best interests of the children standard
when it ordered Father's visitation rights from 35% to 20%. 9 The District Court also affirmed the
trial court's conclusion because the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support the trial
court's conclusion. The District Court did not conclude that Idaho Code § 32-71 7 ( 1) was not
considered or relevant in its affirmation of the trial court's judgment. Rather, the District court
concluded that even though Idaho Code§ 32-717(1) outlines statutory factors to aid the trial
court in determining custody as to the best interests of the children, the evidence adduced at trial,
permitted the trial court to consider factors outside Idaho Code § 32-71 7( 1) which are more

°

relevant to the issues in this case, as permitted by said statute. 1 For these reasons the District
Court concluded that the "historical amount of time [Father] had spent with the parties' children
and the factors associated with his exercise, or lack thereof, were the most germane and relevant
issues at play." 11 This Court has held that, "equal visitation or residency time is not required for
joint custody." Lamont v. Lamont, 158 Idaho 353, 362, 347 P.3d 645, 654 (2015). Further, this
Court upheld a trial court's judgment as to the parties' custodial time in the light of one parties'
unilateral actions. 12 Id.
The Father's reliance upon the legal standard that, "modification of a decree of child

7 See R., Vol. I, p. 158.
8 See App. Br., p. 7.
9 See R., Vol. I, p. 131 L. 1-3.
10 See R., Vol. I, p. 157
11 Id.
12 This Court in Lamont v. Lamont, found that the magistrate court discussed the mother's unilateral actions
multiple times in its decision and stated that it would hold her conduct against, was not an error in the magistrate
court's consideration of the mother's unilateral actions. Like the mother in Lamont v. Lamont, in this present case,
the Father has unilaterally acted not to exercise the full extent of his adjudicated visitation, and his conduct too
should be held against him and the Mother.
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEFI 9

custody will not be granted" unless the modification, "appears to be in the best interests of the
child's welfare," is greatly misguided at best, and is an attempt for this Court to second guess the
lower court's conclusions in light of Father's permissive acts in this case. Adams v. Adams, 93
Idaho 133, 116, 456 P.2d (1969). See also, Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 52 Idaho 27, 31-32, 10
P.2d 1057 1058-1059 (1932); Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278,283, 281 P.3d 115, 120 (2012). The
record in this case shows that historically, prior to and after a reconciliation attempt, the Father
never fully exercised his adjudicated visitation rights of 35% with the children. Even with
conflicting evidence as to why the Father failed to exercise his adjudicated 35% visitation with
the parties' children, the evidence adduced by and from the Father, showed he historically
refused his visitation rights with the children for a number of reasons 13 . Through his own
unilateral acts the Father produced a material, permanent and substantial change in
circumstances warranting a downward modification 14 , as to visitation rights with the children;
and he, himself, determined that having less visitation with the children was in the best interests
of the children without court intervention 15 . The Mother's Verified Motion to Modify Decree of
Divorce therefore only requested what had historical been occurring as to the children's
visitation with both parents, especially the Father.
The trial court, as a result of Father's unilateral acts, as stated above, was not required to
adhere to all of the factors outlined in Idaho Code § 32-71 7 ( 1) as there were other relevant
factors to consider outside Idaho Code§ 32-717(1), in its' conclusion that modification of the
parties' visitation rights, [were] in the best interest of the child's welfare. Adams v. Adams, 93
Idaho 133, 116 (1969). See also, Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 52 Idaho 27, 31-32 (1932); Clair v.

13 See Tr., Vol. I, p. 218, L. 8-25; p. 221, L. 24-25; and p. 222, L. 1-25.
14 See Woods v. Woods, 163 Idaho 904,906,422 P.3d 1110, 1112 (2018).
15 Woods, 163 Idaho 904,907,422 P.3d 1110,1113 (2018). Holding that the court must look not only for changes of
condition or circumstance which are material, permanent and substantial, but also must thoroughly explore the
ramifications, vis-a-vis the best interest of the child, of any change which is evident.
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Clair, 153 Idaho 278, 283 (2012). The District Court affirmed the trail court's judgment because
the Father had already modified his visitation rights as to the children. 16 Therefore, the lower
court's did appropriately apply the legal standard when concluding that Father's visitation rights
with the children should be modified.
3. Idaho Code§ 32-717 provides the "framework" for determining the best
interests of the children in making a custody decision. Section 32-717(1) sets
forth a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider. Searle v. Searle, 162 Idaho
839, 844, 405 P.3d 1180, 1181 (2017); Findings of Facts [should] afford the
appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision,
so that it might be determined whether the trial court applied the proper law to
the appropriate facts in reaching it ultimate judgment in the case. Quiring v.
Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 565, 944 P.2d 695, 700 (1997).
Father is correct in his argument, that "Idaho Family law practitioners understand that
the factors set forth in Idaho Code § 32-71 7( 1) should be addressed in every custody
proceeding", but should also now, that Idaho Family law practitioners understand that the trial
court is not required to apply just the factors outlined in Idaho Code § 32-717(1 ). Searle v.

Searle, 162 Idaho 839,844,405 P.3d 1180, 1181 (2017). Idaho Family law practitioners know
that a trial court shall consider all relevant factors in its' determination as legal and physical
custody and how that custody applies to the best interests of the children. Id. Idaho Family Law
practitioners further know that trial courts have wide discretion in applying the factors outlined
in Idaho Code§ 32-717(1), and that the trial court is not mandated to just consider the factors
outlined in Idaho Code § 32-71 7( 1) but, is free to consider other factors that may be relevant.

Lamont v. Lamont, 158 Idaho 353, 359, 347 P.3d 645, 651 (2015).
The District Court did not err when it affirmed the trial court's conclusions in modifying
Father's visitation rights. The District Court in its affirmation of the trial court's conclusion
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's F.F. & C.L.17

16 See previous foot note 5 and 6.
17 Id. see previous foot note.
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Father overtly relies on the analysis of Searle v. Searle. This present case is
distinguishable from Searle v. Searle, in that the Father through his own-permissive-unilateralacts modified his visitation rights with his children to his and their detriment, as outlined and
discussed herein above. 18
The trial court is not bound to diagram all of its analysis in its conclusion. Rather, the
trial court must issue a finding of fact "[that is determinative] of a fact support by the evidence,"
and that the magistrate's conclusions oflaw follow from those findings. Searle, 162 Idaho 839,
846,405 P.3d 1180, 1187 (2017). See also, Garner v. Garner, 158 Idaho 932, 934-935, 354 P.3d
494, 496-497 (2015). Here, the District Court concluded that the historical factors the trial court
considered "were the most germane and relevant issues at play," and lead the District Court to
reasonably conclude in its appellate role, that the trial court's conclusions of law follow form
those findings. 19 This Court has upheld lower court's decisions when other factors (history)
outside Idaho Code § 32-71 7 ( 1) were more relevant to the issues in the case. Lamont v. Lamont,
158 Idaho 353, 347 P.3d 645 (2015).
This present case is further distinguishable from Searle v. Searle, because the trial court's
F.F. & C.L. are not merely a recitation the court record. Searle, 162 Idaho 839,844,405 P.3d
1180, 1181 (2017). The trial court's F .F. & C.L. are reasoned conclusions based upon evidence
in the record. 20 As such, the trial court's F.F. & C.L., "afford the appellate court a clear

18 The District Court Stated: "ifldaho Code§ 32-717(1) has any bearing on this proceeding, it is marginal." Is not
an admission that the trial court failed to consider the factors enumerated in Idaho Code § 32-717 ( 1). R. Vol. I, p.
127. The evidence as to the reason(s) the Father spent less time children was conflicted. The District Court
recognized this fact, even in this light, the District Court affirmed the magistrate court's decision because, "the issue
raided by the Mot. Modify Decree was whether the trial court should reduce Father's periods of physical custody
with the parties' children because of Mother's claim that he was not exercising the visitation provided under the
current decree." The District Court reasoned that Mother's request was much more limited and narrow then the
initial evaluation establishing the terms and conditions of the initial custody rights and visitation schedule, which
were ultimately stipulated to by the parties." Because Mother's request was much more limited and narrow it was
not necessary for the trial court to consider all factors outlined in Idaho Code § 32-717 ( 1), but was free to consider
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEFI 12

understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision, so that that it might be determined
whether the trial court applied the proper law to the appropriate facts in reaching its ultimate
judgment in the case." Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 565, 944 P.2d 695, 700 (1997). It is
clear from the trial court's F.F. & C.L., and the District Court's affirmation that the F.F. & C.L.,
"afford the appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision." Id. For
this and other reasons the lower court's decisions should be affirmed.
B. Prior to finding an abuse of discretion, the Court must determine whether or not the
lower court's findings are based upon substantial and competent evidence to
support the magistrate's findings. Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137, 137-138, 911 P.2d
133, 137-138 (1995). If the magistrate provides the methodology or calculations it
used in concluding what a parent's yearly gross income is, including income
received in excess of a forty (40) hour work week ("overtime") at outlined in Rule
126(F)(l)(a)(ii) of the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure; then the lower court
has not abused its discretion. Id.
1. Standard of Review
A magistrate's child support order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Garner v.

Garner, 158 Idaho 932, 934-935, 354 P.3d 494, 496-497 (2015). Under the abuse of discretion
standard, [the Court] conducts a multi-tiered inquiry: (1) whether the trial court rightly perceived
the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to
it, and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Browning v.

Browning, 136 Idaho 691, 693, 39 P.3d 631, 633 (2001). Unless an abuse of discretion
is found, the trial court's order will not be disturbed on appeal. Noble v. Fisher, 126 Idaho 885,
888, 894 P.2d 118, 121 (1994). The trial court did correctly calculate Father's gross income in
accordance to Rule 126(F)(l)(a)(ii) as the F.F. & C.L. show that there was substantial and
competence evidence to support the magistrate's findings. Again, this appears to be an attempt

other relevant factor's it believed were issues at play. R., Vol. I, p. 156-157.
19 See previous foot note 5 & 6.
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by the Father, to have this Court second guess the lower court's decisions.
The magistrate court's F.F. & C.L. demonstrate how the magistrate judge concluded
Father's gross yearly income is $96,474.13. 21 This Court, in Rohr v. Rohr, upheld the trial
court's modification of child support because, "there was substantial and competent evidence to
support the magistrate's finding that a material and substantial change of circumstances had
occurred since the last order modifying the divorce decree." Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137, 137138, 911 P.2d 133, 137-138 (1995). But overturned the Father's income calculation because the
magistrate court did not provide the methodology or calculations it used in concluding the
father's monthly gross income. Id. 22
Not unlike the parties in Rohr v. Rohr, the parties in this present case, since the entry and
filing of the Supp. Divorce Decree filed February 14, 2011, have not modified child support. 23
The trial court in its' F .F. & C.L. found, after an analysis of the facts and evidence at trial, that a
change in Father's income had occurred since entry of the Supp. Divorce Decree in 2011.(f) Id.
However, unlike the magistrate court in Rohr v. Rohr, the lower courts in this present case
provided "the methodology or calculations it used in concluding Father's gross yearly
income" in their findings. 24/d.

20 See R., Vol. I, p. 126-133.
21 In its F .F. & C.L. the trial court in subparagraphs 9-18 outlined how it calculated each of the parties' yearly gross
income. The outline by the trial court was laid out in such a way that the District Court easily affirmed the trial
court's decision modifying child support because, the "trial court made express finding[s] that ninety (90) percent of
Father's 2016 gross income was result of 'work [Father] was required to do for his employer, with ten percent (10%)
being additional voluntary income."' R., Vol. I., p.159
22 Even though this Court did not delineate a rule per se, as expressed in this Reply Brief, the facts of Rohr v. Rohr
the reasoning as to why this Court affirmed and overruled the magistrate court's findings in part, does not change
the fact that in this present case, the magistrate court in detail provided its' methodology and calculations as to how
it concluded that the Father's yearly gross income is $96,474.13. The magistrate court also modified the Mother's
yearly gross income and concluded her income is approx. at $42,840. R., Vol. I, p. 130, L. 16-17.
23 Though conflicting evidence was presented as to the hours the Father worked and whether or not his overtime
was voluntary the evidence presented at trial as to his actual hourly income is not. At trial an exhibit displaying the
Father's 2016 income was admitted in to evidence. R., Vol I, p. 188, Ex. 2. It was further testified by the Mother that
Father's income since 2011 had increased. Tr., Vol I. p. 141, L. 6-25; and p. 142, L. 1-24.
24 The trial court concluded that both parties were attempting to minimize their income for purposes of decreasing
and increasing the child support order. R., Vol. I, p. 130.
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Regardless of whether the magistrate judge specifically outlined each element contained
in I.R.F.L.P. Rule 126(F)(l)(a)(ii) in the F.F. & C.L, as the Father contends it should have, the
fact that the trial court's F.F. & C.L. provide the methodology and calculations as to how it
determined the Father's yearly gross income shows the sufficiency of the evidence presented and
that the evidence is substantial and competent enough to support the findings.
There is substantial and competent evidence on the record to support the lower court's
conclusions justifying a modification of the parties' child support order. Therefore, this Court
should affirm the lower court's decisions as to the child support modification.
IV. Conclusion
The modification of the Father's visitation rights from 35% to 20% was proper in this
case since the evidence presented to the trial court is sufficient enough that its F.F. & C.L.,
afford[s] the appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision, so that
that it might be determined whether the trial court applied the proper law to the appropriate facts
in reaching its ultimate judgment in the case. Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 565, 944 P.2d
695, 700 (1997).
The order for child support was not an abuse the trial court's discretion because the lower
court's provided the methodology or calculations it used in concluding Father's gross yearly
income sufficiently enough that supports its findings. Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 13 7, 13 7138, 911 P.2d 133, 137-138 (1995). The decisions of the lower court's should be affirmed.
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